Inequalities in the benefits of national health insurance on financial protection from out-of-pocket payments and access to health services: cross-sectional evidence from Ghana by Fiestas Navarrete, Lucia et al.
Inequalities in the benefits of national health
insurance on financial protection from out-of-
pocket payments and access to health services:
cross-sectional evidence from Ghana
Lucia Fiestas Navarrete1,2,*, Simone Ghislandi1,3,4, David Stuckler1,4 and
Fabrizio Tediosi 5
1Department of Social and Political Science, Bocconi University, Via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milan, Italy, 2Canadian
Centre for Health Economics, 155 College Street, Toronto, ON M5T 3M6, Canada, 3Centre for Research on Health
and Social Care Management, Bocconi University, Via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milan, Italy, 4Carlo F. Dondena Centre for
Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy, Bocconi University, Via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milan, Italy, 5Swiss
Tropical and Public Health Institute, University of Basel, Socinstrasse 57, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
*Corresponding author. Department of Social and Political Science, Bocconi University, Via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milan,
Italy. E-mail: lucia.fiestas@phd.unibocconi.it
Accepted on 23 August 2019
Abstract
A central pillar of universal health coverage (UHC) is to achieve financial protection from
catastrophic health expenditure. There are concerns, however, that national health insurance
programmes with premiums may not benefit impoverished groups. In 2003, Ghana became the
first sub-Saharan African country to introduce a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) with
progressively structured premium charges. In this study, we test the impact of being insured on
utilization and financial risk protection compared with no enrolment, using the 2012–13 Ghana
Living Standards Survey (n¼72 372). Consistent with previous studies, we observed that partici-
pating in health insurance significantly decreased the probability of unmet medical needs by 15
percentage points (p.p.) and that of incurring catastrophic out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments by
7 p.p. relative to no enrolment in the NHIS. Households living outside a 1-h radius to the nearest
hospital had lower reductions in financial risk from excess OOP medical spending relative to
households living closer (5 p.p. vs 9 p.p.). We also find evidence that in Ghana, the scheme was
highly pro-poor. Once insured, the poorest 40% of households experienced significantly larger
improvements in medical utilization (18 p.p. vs. 8 p.p.) and substantively larger reductions in cata-
strophic OOP health expenditure (10 p.p. vs. 6 p.p.) compared with that of the richest house-
holds. However, health insurance did not benefit vulnerable persons equally from financial risk.
Once insured, poor, low-educated and self-employed households living far from hospitals had
significantly lower reductions in catastrophic OOP medical spending compared with their counter-
parts living closer. Taken together, we show that enrolment in the NHIS is associated with
improved financial protection but less so among geographically remote vulnerable groups. Efforts
to boost not just insurance uptake but also health service delivery may be needed as a supplement
for insurance schemes to accelerate progress towards UHC.
Keywords: Universal health coverage, financial risk protection, utilization, out-of-pocket payments, health insurance, sociogeo-
graphic health inequalities, policy evaluation, Ghana
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Introduction
A strategic global health priority, universal health coverage (UHC),
is widely recognized as the means to ensure that individuals do not
suffer financial hardship when accessing quality health services
(Hogan et al., 2018). One major strategy is to expand health insur-
ance coverage. Previously, studies have found that it can help to re-
duce the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure (Baicker et al.,
2013; Hu et al., 2016) and out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments
(King et al., 2009; Chua and Sommers, 2014), as well as boost util-
ization of health services (Ghislandi et al., 2015; Simon et al., 2017),
and population health outcomes (Sommers et al., 2016, 2017). Yet,
there are ongoing concerns that national health insurance pro-
grammes with premiums may not benefit high-risk and vulnerable
groups, especially those who reside in peripheral and rural areas.
Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African (SSA) country to intro-
duce a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Previous studies
have assessed the catastrophic and impoverishment effects of OOP
health payments prior to the introduction of the NHIS in Ghana
(Akazili et al., 2017a,b). They find that 10.7% of Ghanaian house-
holds spent >10% of their non-food consumption expenditure on
OOP health payments (Akazili et al., 2017a). Consistent with the
international literature, a study by Fenny et al. (2018) using data
from three Ghanaian districts showed that insured individuals were
more likely to seek care for the treatment of malaria, while a study
conducted in the Eastern and Central regions found that insurance
reduced OOP payments and protected households against impover-
ishment (Aryeetey et al., 2016).
Although there is a consensus that health insurance can improve
utilization and financial risk protection among the insured, the lit-
erature offers conflicting evidence on the protective effect of insur-
ance among high-risk beneficiaries. Based on a large randomized
assessment of ‘Seguro Popular’, the Mexican health insurance pro-
gramme, King et al. (2009) found that the poorest beneficiaries of
insurance experienced greater reductions in catastrophic health ex-
penditure. In contrast, a study by Lu et al. (2012) evaluating the im-
pact of ‘Mutuelles’, the Rwandan community-based health
insurance programme, found that the poorest beneficiaries had the
lowest rates of utilization and highest rates of catastrophic expend-
iture. Moreover, a recent study by Grogger et al. (2015) found that
beneficiaries living in areas with access to single-nucleus health
facilities experience significantly lower reductions in catastrophic
expenditure compared with rural-dwelling beneficiaries with access
to larger facilities. Though Grogger et al.’s findings regard beneficia-
ries with access to differently staffed facilities, they offer insights
into the potentially moderating effect of distance to care on the rela-
tionship between health insurance and financial risk protection.
A growing body of work has recognized the effect of distance
and travel time to health facilities on utilization. Karra et al. (2016)
pooled data from 21 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to
estimate associations among facility distance, child mortality and
utilization. Their findings show that the children living within 2, 3
and 5 km of a facility have 8%, 16%,and 25% higher odds of
neonatal mortality, respectively, compared with that of the children
living within 1 km distance. Masters et al. (2013) investigated the ef-
fect of travel time on the likelihood of in-facility delivery (IFD)
among rural households in Ghana and found that a 1 h increase in
travel time reduced the odds of IFD by 24%. While the accruing lit-
erature reveals important associations between travel time and util-
ization, there is a lacuna of studies investigating the potentially
moderating role of travel time in the relationship between insurance,
utilization and catastrophic expenditure. Moreover, considering the
large heterogeneity of populations with limited access to healthcare
facilities, a limitation of prior work is an inability to disaggregate
findings by social position and test the hypothesis of differential
benefit among geographically remote disenfranchized groups.
To address these gaps, we draw on the 2012–13 Ghana Living
Standards Survey data (n¼72 371) and examine the impact of the
first NHIS in SSA in its first 10 years of implementation. We stratify
population subgroups based on travel time to the nearest hospital
and household socioeconomic characteristics to evaluate the effect
of health insurance on financial risk protection and utilization
among high-risk and vulnerable beneficiaries with and without lim-
ited geographic accessibility to care. We use probit models with re-
gion fixed effects, which were further tested using propensity score
matching (PSM) and instrumental variable (IV) estimation methods
to address potential selection bias into insurance. Using this sample,
we test the hypothesis that the poorest benefit more from national
health insurance schemes, but that this is attenuated for beneficiaries
living in remote settings.
Ghana’s NHIS
Established in 2003, the NHIS sought to eliminate user fees and
eradicate the financial barriers created by earlier reforms. In the pre-
NHIS policy period, OOP payments contributed 48% of the total
health expenditure (Leive and Xu, 2008). The current NHIS offers
free access to a package of diagnostic, inpatient and outpatient serv-
ices covering 95% of conditions afflicting Ghanaians (NHIS, 2018).
The scheme is characterized by a ‘mandatory-voluntary’ ‘mode of
Key Messages
• In Ghana, participation in the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) increased the probability of meeting medical
needs and decreased the probability of incurring catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments.
• We reveal significant inequalities in the benefits derived from the NHIS across sociogeographic subgroups and find
evidence that though the poorest benefit most from health insurance, these benefits are curtailed among vulnerable
groups living outside a 1-h radius to the nearest hospital.
• Our study reveals the extent to which the social benefit of public health insurance derives from geographic accessibility
to essential health facilities and highlights the socioeconomic groups for whom distance to care matters most.
• From a policy point of view, we show that improving the geographic availability of quality health services is as import-
ant as promoting enrolment in national health insurance schemes in order to boost progress towards universal
coverage in low- and middle-income countries.
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participation’ that effectively creates a three-tier enrolment structure
whereby (1) formal workers are automatically covered through
deductible social contributions, (2) informal workers are covered
voluntarily through annual premium payments and (3) vulnerable
persons are exempted from paying premiums altogether.
Premiums range from 7.20 to 48 Ghana Cedis (GHS; USD
1.60–10.60) per adult annually, varying according to region of
residence. Vulnerable groups that qualify for exemptions include
children under 18, adults over 70, pregnant women, individuals
with disabilities and indigents. Every member must pay an initial
processing fee towards a membership card (GHS 8, c.a. USD 1.82)
and a yearly renewal fee (GHS 5, c.a. USD 1.14). Individuals who
are not registered in the NHIS are obliged to make OOP payments
every time they access health services, which may result in finan-
cial hardship.
Mixed participation generates a differential ‘basis for benefit
entitlement’: contributory for formal workers, discretionary for
informal workers and non-contributory for vulnerable persons.
Though coverage varies widely as a result, Ghana’s scheme type is
not uncommon among LMICs experimenting with health financing
reforms as part of broader UHC strategies (Tangcharoensathien
et al., 2011).
Materials and methods
Source of data
We use data from the sixth Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS-
6). The details have been described elsewhere [Ghana Statistical
Service (GSS), 2014] but briefly, GLSS-6 is a nationwide representa-
tive household survey conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service in
2012–13. A two-stage stratified random sampling framework was
employed at both regional and national levels. In the first stage,
1200 enumeration areas (i.e. clusters) were sampled across 10 geo-
graphic regions with weighted probabilities proportional to popula-
tion size. In the second stage, 15 households were randomly selected
from each cluster. Thus, covering a nationally representative sample
of 72 372 individuals living within 16 772 households across 1200
clusters. We restricted the study sample to individuals who were
either enrolled in the NHIS (treatment group) or did not have any
form of insurance (control group).
Outcome measures
Catastrophic expenditure is a binary outcome variable indicating
whether OOP health payments absorbed an excessive share of the
household budget. OOP health payments consist of annual house-
hold level spending on both inpatient and outpatient services and
all other reported spending directly related to the receipt of health
services. We express OOP health payments as a ratio of total
household non-food consumption (Wagstaff et al., 2018), which is
obtained by deducting total annual food consumption ðFÞ from
each household’s total annual real consumption ðChÞ : OOPh=
ðCh  FhÞ. Catastrophic expenditure corresponds to OOP health
payments that absorb >10% of household non-food consumption:
x < OOPh= ðCh  FhÞ < 1, where x ¼ 0:1. Utilization is a binary
outcome variable indicating whether an individual used medical
services if she were ill or injured in the previous 2 weeks of
the survey. Although our utilization outcome variable operates
at the individual level, the financial risk protection outcome
variable operates at the household level. This reflects the fact
that: (1) expenditure is an intra-household, rather than individual,
decision and (2) GLSS-6 reports expenditure data only at the
household level.
Independent variables
We created a binary variable ‘NHIS’ to represent an individual’s
participation in the NHIS, where 1¼ insured and 0, otherwise. The
sociodemographic variables contained in the medical utilization
analysis include age and gender of the respondent, gender, education
and employment status of the household head, household size,
household consumption expenditure and rural residence. We
included a binary variable to indicate whether an individual lives in
a household with at least one elderly member, as well as a dummy
variable indicating whether an individual lives in a household
located outside a 1-h travel radius to the nearest hospital. A radio
ownership dummy variable was built to detect the effect of public
health education, often accessed via radio programming. We used
two dummy variables to indicate whether an individual who self-
reported illness or injury in the 2 weeks prior to the survey was
forced to stop her usual activities due to the ailment’s severity and
whether an individual suffered from any kind of disability. We
included 10 regional dummy variables to control for heterogeneity
of unobserved health systems-related characteristics across regions.
Due to the household-level nature of the financial risk protection
analysis, we use insured households as the ‘NHIS’ treatment group,
whereby household insurance status derives from that of the house-
hold head.
Statistical models
We use probit models with region fixed effects to estimate the im-
pact of health insurance on the probability that an individual uses
medical care when ill or injured, and the probability that an individ-
ual lives in a household that incurs catastrophic OOP health expend-
iture (Equation 1). Each model postulates that utilization ðm1Þ and
financial risk protection ðm2Þ are functions of insurance status
c1NHISi, in addition to sociodemographic, household and geo-
graphic characteristics:
Y
m1; 2
ihr ¼ a1 þ c1NHISi þX
0
ib1 þW
0
ihd1 þZ
0
ihrf1 þ e1ihr (1)
where individual-level ðiÞ variables are represented by the vector b,
household-level ðhÞ variables by the vector d and region-level ðrÞ
dummy variables by the vector f.
Evaluating potential effect differences
To examine the effect of health insurance on utilization, we
restricted our study sample to individuals who reported being sick
or injured in the 2 weeks prior to the survey (n¼10 311), whereas
to study financial risk protection, we restricted our sample to indi-
viduals whose households made any OOP health payments in the
year of the survey (n¼25 971). To evaluate differences in the effect
of health insurance across vulnerable subgroups, we disaggregated
our sample across levels of household socioeconomic characteristics.
These include household consumption expenditure, education and
employment status of the household head. Across each subgroup,
we tested whether travel time to care (within vs. outside a 1-h radius
to the nearest hospital) influences the effect of insurance on utiliza-
tion and financial risk protection.
We use travel time to care since it implicitly encompasses not
only distance but also difficulty of travel and may better reflect the
decision-making process to utilize services (Masters et al., 2013).
We select hospitals as the single site from which to derive travel time
because they tend to offer a comprehensive array of services avail-
able through the NHIS (e.g. diagnostic, inpatient and outpatient).
The median time travelled to the nearest hospital in our sample is
60 min (IQR: 60) and the mean 73 (SD: 69.4). Hence, we proceed
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with a median-split to categorize subpopulations within and outside
a 1-h travel time. Aligned with the relevant literature, previous stud-
ies based in SSA countries confirm that travel times to health facili-
ties of at least 1 h present a sufficient barrier to access services
(Okwaraji et al., 2012; Masters et al., 2013).
Identification strategy
A key methodological challenge facing our study is the requirement
that the individual decision to enrol in health insurance be uncorre-
lated with observable and unobservable determinants of utilization
and health expenditure. This assumption is challenging, as insurance
status is likely to incorporate an ex ante need for medical care, with
the consequent problem of selection bias. The importance of testing
and accounting for potential endogeneity of insurance participation
in models explaining variability in health service use and catastroph-
ic expenditure has been investigated widely (Hellinger and Wong,
2000; Liang et al., 2004).
Drawing from the approach used by Lu et al. (2012), we con-
structed a measure of cluster NHIS insurance prevalence rate and
used it as an IV to approximate an exogenous source of variation in
insurance participation. Our data are composed of 1200 clusters,
each representing a demarcated geographic area that consists of 15
households. The NHIS prevalence rate for an individual i living in
cluster k equals the number of insured persons in cluster k minus the
insurance status of the same individual divided by the total number
of persons in the cluster. The assumptions that individuals living in
geographic clusters characterized by high insurance rates are more
likely to be insured (relevance) and that cluster insurance rate affects
neither an individual’s decision to use medical services nor a house-
hold’s decision to spend on health directly (exclusion) are reasonable
and discussed in Lu et al. (2012).
We postulate that a correlation between the endogenous regres-
sor and our instrument is possible for different reasons. For ex-
ample: (1) clusters of enrolled individuals might arise because
residents in some geographical areas share higher quality of medical
services, and (2) individuals living in a geographic area with a higher
concentration of insured individuals may be influenced by the enrol-
ment behaviour of their peers (DiMaggio and Garip, 2012). The
peer-effect claim is supported by a recent study, which revealed that
presenting health insurance information to informal groups had a
larger effect on retention and trust in the insurance scheme than full
premium subsidies (Chemin, 2018).
We included cluster insurance rate in first-stage probit regres-
sions and obtained the predicted probabilities of NHIS participation
for each individual:
NHISi ¼ a2 þ c2cluster ratei þX0ib2 þW
0
ihd2 þ Z
0
ihrf2 þ e2ihr (2)
which were used to estimate the effect of health insurance on utiliza-
tion and financial risk protection in the respective second-stage IV
regressions:
Y
m1; 2
ihr ¼ a3 þ c3NH^ISi þX
0
ib3 þW
0
ihd3 þZ
0
ihrf3 þ e3ihr (3)
To mitigate possible selection bias due to observable characteris-
tics, a PSM estimator was calculated, using NHIS-affiliated individ-
uals as the treatment group (Imbens, 2004). We used the nearest
neighbour (NN) matching without replacement approach and
restricted matching within a calliper of 0.0001 to avoid matching by
a neighbour very far from the insured individual but with the closest
propensity score.
We matched treated and control individuals based on covariates
that may influence selection into insurance. For the utilization
outcome equation, we matched individuals based on (1) demograph-
ic (i.e. age, gender), (2) individual-level medical need (i.e. illness se-
verity), (3) head-of-household (i.e. education, employment status),
(4) household (i.e. consumption expenditure, size) and (5) geograph-
ic (i.e. rural residence and travel time) characteristics. For the cata-
strophic expenditure outcome equation, we matched individuals
based on (1) head-of-household (i.e. age, gender, education, employ-
ment status), (2) household (i.e. consumption expenditure, size), (3)
household-level medical need (i.e. presence of elderly members, dis-
abled members, ill members) and (4) geographic (i.e. rural residence,
travel time) characteristics. When conditioning on these covariates,
the observed outcomes of uninsured units can be reasonably used to
estimate the counterfactual outcome of insured units in the case of
no treatment.
Standardized differences and t-tests for the covariates used to
satisfy the balancing property offer evidence that the propensity
scores were properly identified (see Supplementary Tables S1 and
S2). These tables report, separately for the two outcomes, the mean
characteristics by insurance status. Differences between the insured
and uninsured groups are arguably small and become even smaller
after matching. These are the subsets of treated and control subjects
that are effectively used in the estimation of the causal effect of
interest throughout the matched probit specifications (without and
with IV). Common support for each model can be assessed by exam-
ining the distribution of propensity scores across groups (Figures 1
and 2).
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for insured and uninsured
groups in our sample. About 36% of individuals were insured by the
NHIS. Among the 45 405 uninsured individuals, 16% were insured
in the past but had failed to renew their annual NHIS membership,
whereas the remaining 84% had never been insured. The most fre-
quently reported reason for never having registered for health insur-
ance (63%) and for failing to renew the NHIS membership (38%)
was having ‘No money’. As it regards enrolment, 67% of insured
individuals became NHIS members by paying a premium, whereas
31% qualified for a premium exemption. The mean premium pay-
ment was GHS 7.74. Moreover, within premium exempted groups,
insured individuals were a persistent minority: 38% of children
under 18, 48% of adults over 70, 46% of pregnant women and
37% of individuals living with disabilities were insured.
Medical care utilization
Table 2 presents probit regression results generated from the un-
matched data, PSM data and PSM data with IV for utilization analy-
ses in the sample of individuals that reported illness or injury 2
weeks prior to the survey. Results from the first-stage IV-probit re-
gression are shown in Column (3), providing strong evidence that
the cluster insurance rate significantly predicts participation in the
NHIS. Findings on the effect of the NHIS on utilization are positive,
sizeable and significant across specifications: individuals insured by
the NHIS are more likely to use medical services when needed com-
pared with their uninsured counterparts after controlling for other
factors.
Financial risk protection
Table 3 presents probit regression results for the financial risk pro-
tection analyses generated from the unmatched data, PSM data and
PSM data with IV. Column (3) shows the results from the first-stage
Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 34, No. 9 697
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IV-probit regression, which instruments health insurance with clus-
ter insurance rate and offers strong evidence that the instrument sig-
nificantly predicts participation in the NHIS. Findings are
consistently negative and significant across specifications: after con-
trolling for covariates, individuals enrolled in the NHIS are signifi-
cantly less likely to live in households that incur catastrophic health
expenditure.
The NHIS coefficient in Tables 2 and 3 remains stable across
models, changing slightly with the IV estimation. Since we have no
prior regarding the size and direction of coefficient changes when
the IV is implemented, these results show that the impact of the
NHIS is robust and in the expected direction. The fact that the
NHIS coefficient on utilization is smaller in the PSM-IV analysis im-
plicitly confirms that the instrument addresses selection bias into in-
surance. Assuming that the IV approach overcomes the bias of naı¨ve
estimators, we suggest that coefficients associated with the PSM-IV
specifications represent the effect that we are actually interested in—
that of health insurance on a sample of individuals who comply with
the assignment to the treatment given by cluster rate. Hence, we use
PSM-IV specifications to compute local average treatment effect
estimates when disentangling main effects into subgroup estimates.
A common objection to the classic catastrophic expenditure def-
inition employed here is that it ignores important differences in the
budget capacity of poor and non-poor households. To test the ro-
bustness of our results, we used Wagstaff and Eozenou’s (2014) uni-
fied financial risk protection methodology, yielding unique outcome
variables relevant to population groups above and below the pov-
erty line (see Supplementary Figure S1). The comprehensive ration-
ale and implementation of the method can be found in the original
article (Wagstaff and Eozenou, 2014). Our results are robust to the
use of different outcome variables. Table 4 shows that enrolment in
Figure 2 Distribution of propensity scores using nearest neighbour matching
for financial risk protection across treatment and comparison groups and rep-
resentation of standardized bias between matched and unmatched samples,
Ghana 2012–13.
Figure 1 Distribution of propensity scores using nearest neighbour matching
for medical utilization across treatment and comparison groups and repre-
sentation of standardized bias between matched and unmatched samples,
Ghana 2012–13.
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the NHIS significantly reduces financial hardship resulting from
OOP health payments among families living above and below the
poverty line.
Heterogeneity by proximity to care
Table 5 presents the effect estimates of health insurance on utiliza-
tion and financial risk protection. Our results show that enrolment
in the NHIS increases the probability of meeting medical needs
by 15 percentage points (p.p.) while decreasing the probability of
incurring catastrophic OOP health payments by 7 p.p. relative to no
enrolment. When disaggregating the population based on proximity
to care, we observe that the effect of insurance on improved utiliza-
tion is larger among insured individuals living within a 1-h travel
time to the nearest hospital (17 p.p. increase) than for individuals
living farther than 1 h away (14 p.p. increase). We also observe that
the effect of health insurance on improved financial risk protection
is larger among insured individuals living within a 1-h radius to the
nearest hospital (9 p.p. decrease in catastrophic expenditure) than
for insured individuals living farther (5 p.p. decrease). Overall, the
effects of health insurance on improved utilization and financial risk
protection are most pronounced among insured individuals living
within 1-h travel time to a hospital.
Differences in utilization by socioeconomic factors and
proximity to care
Table 6 presents effect estimates of health insurance on the probabil-
ity of utilization across different socioeconomic subgroups and dis-
aggregated by proximity to care. Enrolment in the NHIS has a
positive, sizable and statistically significant effect on medical service
use across socioeconomic subgroups relative to no enrolment. The
effect of health insurance on improved utilization is significantly
larger among the poorest 40% of the population (18 p.p. increase),
compared with that of the richest 40% (8 p.p. increase; P¼0.003).
When we disaggregate socioeconomic groups based on proximity to
care, we find that vulnerable groups (i.e. individuals living in poorer,
lower educated and self-employed households) benefit consistently
less from health insurance when living outside a 1-h radius from the
nearest hospital.
Differences in financial risk protection by
socioeconomic factors and proximity to care
Table 7 presents the effect estimates of health insurance on the prob-
ability of catastrophic OOP health expenditure across socioeco-
nomic subgroups and disaggregated by proximity to care. Overall,
enrolment in the NHIS has a negative, sizable and statistically sig-
nificant effect on financial risk due to catastrophic health expend-
iture across socioeconomic subgroups relative to no enrolment. The
effect of health insurance on improved financial risk protection is
larger among the poorest households (10 p.p. decrease in cata-
strophic expenditure), compared with that of the richest (6 p.p. de-
crease; P<0.10). We observe larger reductions of catastrophic
health expenditure among households headed by members with
higher compared with that of the lower education (14 p.p. vs 3 p.p.;
P<0.000) and among households headed by employed, compared
with that of the self-employed members (16 p.p. vs 6 p.p.; P¼0.04).
When we disaggregate socioeconomic groups based on proximity to
care, we consistently find that vulnerable groups who live farther
than 1 h away from the nearest hospital benefit significantly less
from the financial protection afforded by health insurance.
Robustness checks
We conducted a series of robustness and sensitivity tests on our
PSM models by comparing relative effects across three alternative
matching methods. In addition to NN without replacement, we
applied kernel, radius and Mahalanobis matching. We verified the
covariate balance graphically across matching procedures by com-
paring the standardized bias in matched and unmatched samples
(see Supplementary Figures S2 and S3). In addition, we used two
balancing tests for each alternative method: standardized differences
and t-tests (see Supplementary Tables S3–S8) and estimated average
treatment effects on the treated (ATT) for each outcome variable
obtained from the four matching methods. Table 8 shows that the
ATT estimates for the two outcomes do not change significantly
between matching methods.
We also conducted simulation-based sensitivity analyses allow-
ing us to assess whether the ATT estimates are robust to failures of
unconfoundedness. All sensitivity analyses convey robustness of the
Table 1 Descriptive statistics, Ghana 2012–13
Uninsured NHIS Insured
N (%) N (%)
Individuals 45 405 (63.68) 25 894 (36.32)
Households 11 292 (67.44) 5452 (32.56)
Age categories
Under 5 5844 (12.87) 3584 (13.84)
5–18 16 057 (35.36) 9659 (37.30)
19–44 16 001 (35.24) 7827 (30.23)
45–74 6697 (14.75) 4039 (15.60)
75 and older 806 (1.78) 785 (3.03)
Female 22 720 (50.04) 13 998 (54.06)
Education of household head
No schooling 15 081 (33.24) 8537 (32.99)
Up to primary 11 551 (25.46) 6157 (23.79)
More than primary 18 733 (41.29) 11 187 (43.22)
Household head is self-employed 34 562 (80.28) 19 473 (78.97)
Expenditure quintiles
Poorest 14 001 (30.84) 7347 (28.37)
Poorer 9305 (20.40) 5626 (21.73)
Middle 8070 (17.77) 4835 (18.67)
Richer 7323 (16.13) 4246 (16.40)
Richest 6706 (14.77) 3840 (14.83)
Health need and medical care utilization (2 weeks)
Illness or injury 6149 (13.56) 4162 (16.10)
Stopped activities due to severity 3692 (59.99) 2697 (64.61)
Sought care due to illness or injury 3699 (60.16) 3131 (75.23)
OOP health expenditure by quintile
All households 6391 (56.60) 2993 (54.90)
Poor 1234 (19.31) 484 (16.17)
Poorer 1197 (18.73) 554 (18.51)
Middle 1224 (19.15) 604 (20.18)
Richer 1256 (19.65) 615 (20.55)
Richest 1480 (23.16) 736 (24.59)
All households 552 (4.62) 232 (4.26)
Poorest 145 (1.28) 43 (0.79)
Poorer 132 (1.17) 43 (0.79)
Middle 108 (0.96) 51 (0.94)
Richer 91 (0.81) 50 (0.92)
Richest 76 (1.19) 45 (0.83)
Hospital >1 ha 12 545 (46.64) 5503 (33.50)
Rural residence 27 919 (61.49) 16 239 (62.71)
aMerged from Section 42 of the GLSS 6 Community questionnaire, which
collected information on distance to health facilities using a reduced sample
of 44 056 individuals within 643 clusters.
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matching estimate with respect to reasonable failures of the
conditional independence assumption (see Supplementary Tables
S9–S12). The comprehensive rationale and implementation of the
method can be found in the original article (Ichino et al., 2008).
Conclusion
Detecting the conditions under which national health insurance sys-
tems offer protection to the insured and identifying the least pro-
tected beneficiaries is an important, albeit largely under-investigated
Table 2 Utilization results using probit models with unmatched data, propensity score matched data (PSM) and matched data with instru-
mental variable (PSM-IV), Ghana 2012–13
Medical care when ill or injured
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unmatched PSM First-stage PSM-IV PSM-IV
NHIS 0.43*** 0.43*** . 0.22***
(0.36–0.50) (0.35–0.51) (0.05–0.39)
Cluster insurance rate 0.98***
(0.93–1.02)
Age categories
Under 5 (Reference)
5–18 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.03 0.30***
(0.40 to 0.20) (0.41 to 0.18) (0.06 to 0.01) (0.41 to 0.19)
19–44 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.10*** 0.30***
(0.40 to 0.19) (0.39 to 0.16) (0.13 to 0.06) (0.41 to 0.18)
45–74 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.03 0.34***
(0.45 to 0.23) (0.46 to 0.21) (0.06 to 0.01) (0.46 to 0.21)
75 and older 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.06* 0.27**
(0.54 to 0.16) (0.49 to 0.07) (0.00 to 0.13) (0.48 to 0.05)
Female 0.06* 0.05 0.02 0.04
(0.00 to 0.13) (0.10 to 0.19) (0.02 to 0.07) (0.10 to 0.19)
Female household head 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.08
(0.14 to 0.03) (0.19 to 0.03) (0.03 to 0.04) (0.18 to 0.03)
Education of household head
No schooling (Reference)
Up to primary 0.07 0.08* 0.02 0.09*
(0.02 to 0.15) (0.01 to 0.18) (0.02 to 0.05) (0.01 to 0.18)
More than primary 0.08 0.04 0.05*** 0.05
(0.02 to 0.17) (0.08 to 0.15) (0.02–0.09) (0.06 to 0.16)
Household head is self-employed 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.04 to 0.19) (0.15 to 0.11) (0.04 to 0.05) (0.15 to 0.12)
Expenditure quintiles
Poorest (Reference)
Poorer 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.03 0.16***
(0.07–0.25) (0.04–0.26) (0.01 to 0.06) (0.05–0.27)
Middle 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.03 0.22***
(0.10–0.31) (0.08–0.36) (0.01 to 0.07) (0.08–0.36)
Richer 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.03 0.26***
(0.15–0.40) (0.08–0.44) (0.03 to 0.09) (0.08–0.44)
Richest 0.29*** 0.25** 0.05 0.26**
(0.14–0.44) (0.02–0.48) (0.01 to 0.12) (0.03–0.49)
Household size 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00 to 0.02) (0.01 to 0.03) (0.01 to 0.01) (0.02 to 0.02)
Severity of illness or injury 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.01 0.45***
(0.38–0.52) (0.31–0.59) (0.03 to 0.05) (0.30–0.59)
Hospital >1 h 0.08** 0.08 0.07* 0.07
(0.15 to 0.01) (0.36 to 0.19) (0.01 to 0.16) (0.34 to 0.20)
Rural residence 0.20** 0.27 0.13*** 0.23
(0.36 to 0.04) (0.62 to 0.09) (0.03–0.23) (0.58 to 0.12)
Observations 6307 4920 4920 4920
Controls and Region FE included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald test P-value <0.001
Robust 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses. Controls include 10 region dummies, disability, cohabitation with elderly members and radio
ownership.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
700 Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 34, No. 9
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/heapol/article-abstract/34/9/694/5572246 by W
W
Z Bibliothek (O
effentliche Bibliotherk der U
niversitÃ¤t Basel) user on 02 D
ecem
ber 2019
area of research. Our findings show that participation in the NHIS
increased the probability of meeting medical needs and decreased
the probability of incurring catastrophic OOP health payments rela-
tive to no enrolment. We reveal significant effect differences across
socioeconomic subgroups and find evidence that the poorest benefit
most from health insurance, though these benefits are significantly
curtailed among geographically remote vulnerable groups.
We consistently find that poorer beneficiaries living outside a 1-
h travel time to the nearest hospital benefit significantly less from
the financially protective effect of health insurance. The fact that
higher travel times are associated with utilization and financial pro-
tection penalties among vulnerable beneficiaries reveals an insightful
decision-making mechanism. Poorer, less educated and precariously
employed geographically remote households tend to forgo care, des-
pite being insured, due to the time, difficulty and/or costs associated
with reaching a health facility. For households faced by the
disincentive of living far from a hospital, being enrolled in insurance
is not a sufficiently effective incentive to utilize services even with
the expectation of free care upon arrival.
We show that being enrolled in the NHIS may still not be suffi-
cient to ensure financial risk protection and access to health services
among the most disenfranchized sociogeographic subgroups. They
highlight that insurance schemes are unlikely to safeguard financial
protection from catastrophic expenditure if higher-level healthcare
facilities are not geographically accessible. Our findings are in line
with a recent analysis of the Community-based Health Planning and
Services initiative in Ghana, which underlined the importance of
bridging geographical access to healthcare as a prerequisite to deliv-
ering on the promise of universal coverage (Assan et al., 2018).
Our findings are consistent with recent work by Grogger et al.
(2015) who showed that ‘Seguro Popular’ provided greater financial
protection in areas proximate to larger health facilities. In addition
Table 3 Financial risk protection results using probit models with unmatched data, propensity score matched data (PSM) and matched data
with instrumental variable (PSM-IV), Ghana 2012 13
OOP payment exceeds 10% of non-food consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unmatched PSM First-stage PSM-IV PSM-IV
NHIS 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.47***
(0.19 to 0.09) (0.19 to 0.05) (0.66 to 0.29)
Cluster insurance rate 0.79***
(0.76–0.82)
Age of household head 0.00* 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
(0.00 to 0.00) (0.00 to 0.01) (0.00 to 0.00) (0.00 to 0.01)
Female household head 0.16*** 0.30*** 0.00 0.29***
(0.10–0.23) (0.19–0.40) (0.03 to 0.03) (0.19–0.40)
Education of household head
No schooling (Reference)
Up to primary 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04
(0.10 to 0.01) (0.06 to 0.14) (0.02 to 0.03) (0.06 to 0.14)
More than primary 0.06* 0.09 0.04** 0.10
(0.13 to 0.00) (0.07 to 0.24) (0.00–0.08) (0.06 to 0.26)
Household head is self-employed 0.01 0.08 0.07*** 0.10
(0.08 to 0.10) (0.09 to 0.25) (0.03–0.10) (0.06 to 0.27)
Expenditure quintiles
Poorest (Reference)
Poorer 0.07** 0.03 0.02* 0.02
(0.13 to 0.01) (0.12 to 0.07) (0.00 to 0.04) (0.12 to 0.07)
Middle 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.03* 0.25***
(0.36 to 0.21) (0.38 to 0.12) (0.00 to 0.06) (0.38 to 0.11)
Richer 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.01 0.34***
(0.42 to 0.24) (0.52 to 0.16) (0.03 to 0.05) (0.52 to 0.16)
Richest 0.63*** 0.48*** 0.04 0.49***
(0.75 to 0.50) (0.71 to 0.26) (0.09 to 0.01) (0.72 to 0.27)
Household size 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.05***
(0.08 to 0.06) (0.07 to 0.04) (0.01 to 0.00) (0.07 to 0.04)
Hospital > 1hr 0.03 0.04 0.15*** 0.09
(0.02 to 0.08) (0.35 to 0.43) (0.06–0.24) (0.30 to 0.48)
Rural residence 0.20*** 0.03 0.18*** 0.02
(0.07–0.33) (0.35 to 0.29) (0.10–0.26) (0.31 to 0.34)
Observations 25 971 12 684 12 684 12 684
Catastrophic OOP observations 2089 936 936 936
Non-Catastrophic OOP observations 23 882 11 748 11 748 11 748
Controls and region FE included YES YES YES YES
Wald test P-value <0.001
Robust 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses. Controls include 10 region dummies, disability, disease severity, cohabitation with elderly members
and radio ownership.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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to confirming these findings, the most novel contribution of our
paper is to unveil the differential effects of health insurance by dis-
tance to care and socioeconomic characteristics. In doing so, we
sought to draw more convincing conclusions regarding the benefits
of health insurance as experienced by families with distinctive a pri-
ori degrees of vulnerability. Our results are also aligned with those
obtained by previous studies on Ghana (Akazili et al., 2017a,b) and
elsewhere (van Doorslaer et al., 2007), which voiced the inherent
challenge of providing financial protection to the most vulnerable
beneficiaries. Taken together, our findings confirm that improving
the geographic availability of quality health services is as important
as promoting enrolment in national health insurance schemes in
order to boost progress towards UHC.
Moreover, the fact that households headed by less-educated
members benefit less from the financially protective effect of health
insurance indicates that navigating and securing the benefits of a na-
tional health insurance product is dependent upon the education
level of beneficiaries. This partially reflects Hart’s (1971) inverse
care logic, explaining why beneficiaries with low education levels
and reasonably poor understanding of health insurance would be
less able to leverage insurance claims.
To ensure that the benefits of health insurance be experienced
equitably across sociogeographic groups, UHC-driven policies
should be enhanced with parallel improvements in transport infra-
structure and focused expansion of the current hospital network to
poorly serviced geographic areas. Our findings suggest that travel
time is at least one of the decision-making components compelling
insured individuals to seek or forgo needed healthcare. As such, we
recommend the implementation of targeted health education inter-
ventions aiming to incentivize prompt care-seeking behaviour
among geographically remote vulnerable groups. Our findings alsoT
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Table 5 Effect estimates of health insurance on medical utilization
and financial risk protection by distance to nearest hospital using
IV-probit models and propensity score matched datasets, Ghana
2012–13
Local average treatment effect
Medical care
utilization
when ill or injured
OOP payment
exceeds 10% of non
-food consumption
(1) (2)
PSM-IV probit PSM-IV probit
All individuals 0.15*** 20.07***
(0.13–0.18) (0.10 to 0.03)
4920 12 684
Individuals living
within 1-h radius
to nearest hospital
0.17*** 20.09***
(0.13–0.20) (0.13 to 0.05)
3003 7803
Individuals living
outside 1-h radius
to nearest hospital
0.14*** 0.05**
(0.09–0.18) (0.09 to 0.004)
1917 4881
(T-statistic P-value) (0.15) (0.07)
Numbers in bold are estimated effects. The 95% confidence intervals are
given in parentheses. Last number in each cell is the sample size.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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indicate shortcomings concerning the implementation of policies
meant to protect vulnerable people. In Ghana, vulnerable groups are
exempted from paying enrolment premiums, however, the imple-
mentation of these policies is challenging. There may be important
underlying conflicts between healthcare providers facing budget
constraints and reimbursement uncertainty, and policies seeking to
broaden access to care among vulnerable beneficiaries. Thus, imple-
mentation inefficiencies may be part of the explanation as to why
some of the most vulnerable NHIS enrolees are least protected from
financial hardship.
These implications extend well-beyond Ghana, as other SSA
countries with similar fiscal constraints are experimenting with hy-
brid health insurance schemes alike. Among them, Rwanda and
Ethiopia have exemptions built-in their health financing structures
aiming to target destitute groups. Our findings suggest that,
although exemptions are part of the way forward, closer attention
should be paid to long-term investments in road quality, supply net-
work expansion and health education policies. Indeed, by targeting
the junction of social, economic and geographic vulnerability, poli-
cymakers may be better able to identify a burdened high-risk group
that is not yet benefitting from health insurance equitably despite
the presence of well-intentioned exemptions.
These findings should be viewed in light of the following limita-
tions. First, although the comprehensive objectives that our work
seeks to examine include access to promotive, preventive, curative,
rehabilitative and palliative health services, we are able to assess the
impact of health insurance on medical utilization focusing on cura-
tive care only. Second, though we consider UHC not as an end in
and of itself but the means towards better health outcomes, our
study assesses the effect of health insurance on improved health
Table 7 Bootstrapped local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of health insurance on catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure
using IV-probit models and propensity score matched datasets, Ghana 2012–13
Household consumption expenditure Education of household head Employment of household head
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poorest 40% Richest 40% Up to primary > Primary Self-employed Employed
All individuals 0.10*** 0.06** 0.03* 0.14*** 0.06*** 0.16**
(0.14 to 0.07) (0.10 to 0.01) (0.07 to 0.003) (0.18 to 0.09) (0.09 to 0.03) (0.32 to 0.01)
7624 2336 8603 4081 11 471 927
(T-statistic P-value) (0.10) (<0.001) (0.04)
Distance and poverty Distance and education Distance and employment
Individuals living within
1-h radius to nearest hospital
0.13*** 0.04 0.07*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.13
(0.18 to 0.07) (0.08 to 0.01) (0.11 to 0.02) (0.22 to 0.10) (0.13 to 0.04) (0.35 to 0.10)
4465 1603 5145 2630 6881 851
Individuals living outside
1-h radius to nearest hospital
0.07** 0.24** 0.02 0.19*** 0.04 0.26***
(0.12 to 0.01) (0.44 to 0.04) (0.07 to 0.04) (0.31 to 0.08) (0.09 to 0.02) (0.39 to 0.13)
3128 474 3407 1182 4519 362
(T-statistic P-value)a (0.06) (0.002) (0.07) (0.29) (0.08) (0.24)
Numbers in bold are estimated effects. The 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses. Last number in each cell is the sample size.
aP-values from T-statistics correspond to effect differences between rows 2 and 3.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
Table 6 Bootstrapped local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of health insurance on medical care utilization using IV-probit models
and propensity score matched datasets, Ghana 2012 13
Household consumption expenditure Education of household head Employment of household head
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poorest 40% Richest 40% Up to primary >Primary Self-employed Employed
All individuals 0.18*** 0.08** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.16***
(0.14–0.21) (0.02–0.14) (0.14–0.19) (0.07–0.19) (0.12–0.18) (0.07–0.25)
2921 1054 3309 1627 4381 555
(T-statistic P-value) (0.003) (0.11) (0.41)
Distance and poverty Distance and education Distance and employment
Individuals living within
1-h radius to nearest hospital
0.20*** 0.09** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.14***
(0.16–0.25) (0.02–0.15) (0.13–0.22) (0.10–0.21) (0.13–0.21) (0.04–0.25)
1589 761 1863 1132 2573 422
Individuals living outside
1-h radius to nearest hospital
0.15*** 0.10 0.16*** 0.08* 0.13*** 0.42
(0.09–0.21) (0.04 to 0.23) (0.11–0.20) (0.01 to 0.17) (0.08–0.17) (0.08 to 0.92)
1332 293 1446 495 1808 119
(T-statistic P-value)a (0.07) (0.44) (0.25) (0.09) (0.08) (0.053)
Numbers in bold are estimated effects. The 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses. Last number in each cell is the sample size.
aP-values from T-statistics correspond to effect differences between rows 2 and 3.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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service use. Although there is a reason to believe that access to care
leads to improved health outcomes, we do not directly measure the
effect of the NHIS on these outcomes. Third, due to the data avail-
ability our study measures utilization 2 weeks prior to the survey
and as such, offers a partial picture of utilization and a lower bound
estimate of annual health service use. Fourth, the cross-sectional na-
ture of our data has allowed us to capture annual OOP health ex-
penditure at the time of the survey, which we have found to be
sufficient to affect household financial well-being. However, it is
possible that households incur recurrent catastrophic health expen-
ditures, whose consequences may be more detrimental, and for
which longitudinal data are needed.
Overall, this study supports the UHC objective of the Ghanaian
NHIS and offers valuable lessons to other LMICs seeking to broad-
en access to quality healthcare while lessening reliance on OOP pay-
ments. To our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the
effect of health insurance on utilization and financial risk protection
across socioeconomic characteristics based on travel time to care.
Our findings point to the need for developing more effective
approaches to include vulnerable sociogeographic groups in nascent
national health insurance systems and to ensure that they benefit
equitably from utilization and financial protection. Finally, in an ef-
fort to identify the conditions under which health insurance offers
protection to vulnerable beneficiaries, our study offers a novel con-
tribution to the literature from a policy point of view. We reveal the
extent to which the social benefit of health insurance derives from
geographic accessibility to essential health facilities and highlight
the socioeconomic groups for whom distance to care matters most.
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